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Banks and other credit institutions are key players in the transmission of monetary 
policy, especially when the responses of deposit and loan interest rates to shifts in 
policy rates are among the most important channels. This pass-through depends 
on the conditions prevailing in the loan and deposit markets, which are, in turn, 
affected by macroeconomic factors. Hence, when setting their policy, monetary 
authorities must take into account those conditions and the behavior of banks. This 
paper shows this point using a micro-banking model and presents supporting em-
pirical evidence based on monthly data for Colombia between 1999 and 2006.
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1.  Introduction
In some economies, banks and other financial institutions play a key role 
in the expenditure decisions of firms and households. They are among the most 
important alternatives of funding and means of saving. As such, banks and bank 
behavior are critical components of the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy. In particular, the interest rate channel of monetary policy, which operates 30 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
when banks transmit the changes in the monetary policy rate to their customers’ 
interest rates, depends on the banks’ reaction to different shocks and to the state of 
the economy. Hence, when setting their policy, monetary authorities should take 
into account banks’ behavior under different economic conditions.
This paper illustrates the idea that the response of market interest rates to 
changes in the policy interest rate depends on the reaction of banks and financial 
markets to different shocks hitting the economy. For that purpose, we develop a 
theoretical microeconomic model of the banking firm and the credit and deposits 
markets in which the effects of monetary policy and other macroeconomic vari-
ables are included. We also present some supporting evidence for the Colombian 
economy. The results from the empirical analysis (Error Correction –here after 
EC– and VARX models) highlight the importance of macroeconomic variables 
other than the policy interest rate in the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy to the market interest rates.
Specifically, according to the EC models, a shock to the policy rate is trans-
mitted to the bank deposit interest rates to a large extent. However, the estimated 
pass-through is incomplete in the short run for two measures of the deposit rates. 
For one of those measures, the estimated pass-through is also incomplete in the 
long run. At the same time, changes in the EMBI index (JP Morgan Emerging 
Markets Bond Index) have significant and large effects on the deposit rates, and 
other variables like industrial production, the depreciation of the currency and the 
LIBO rate have significant effects on the short-term dynamics of market rates.
The results from the VARX models show that the long run pass-through is 
complete for the two measures of the deposit interest rates used. In addition, the 
cumulative impulse response functions and the Granger Causality tests obtained 
from the VARX estimation indicate that other variables, especially the EMBI, have 
important effects in the determination of market interest rates.
The paper is organized as follows. A brief review of the literature is given 
in section 2. The theoretical model of the banking firm and the financial markets 
equilibrium is developed in section 3. Finally, some supporting evidence for the 
Colombian case is presented in section 4 and we conclude in section 5.
2.  Literature Review
2.1  The Banking Sector and Interest Rate Pass-Through
The literature has identified different transmission mechanisms of monetary 
policy such as the interest rate channel, the credit channel and the exchange rate 
channel among others1. The importance of the banking sector in the transmission 
of interest rates has been recently recognized in the literature on the interest rate 
1 See Loayza and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) for an overview about the transmission mechanisms. Interest Rate Pass-Through in Colombia 31
channel2. At the same time, the credit channel has focused on the agency prob-
lems that arise between financial institutions, particularly banks, and the agents to 
which they lend (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) 3. Therefore, the credit channel 
is now considered as a set of factors that amplify and propagate the effects of the 
interest rate channel through their impact on lending rates and other interest rate 
spreads.
The banking sector has been incorporated in this literature, focusing mainly 
on the financial structure and information asymmetries4. These two elements 
clearly influence the behavior of banks and help explain why lending and deposit 
rates may show a limited response to changes in the monetary policy rate. From 
Hannan and Berger (1991) and Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), the stickiness of 
bank lending interest rates after a change in the money market rates has been 
explained by different features of the financial structure. Empirical studies, like 
Berstein and Fuentes (2003) and Kot (2004) have found some degree of rigidity 
of interest rates in the short run and higher long-run interest rate pass-through 
coefficients. The degree of competition in the banking sector, the size of the bank, 
the types of customers and the loan risk level, among other financial features, have 
been found as the main determinants of interest rate flexibility5.
Furthermore, depending on the country and also on the maturity of the 
interest rates, they may respond less than one-for-one to policy rates, so that the 
pass-through is incomplete at least in the short run (e.g. De Bondt, 2005). The 
macroeconomic implications of an incomplete long-run pass-through from policy 
to bank interest rates are analyzed by Kwapil and Scharler (2005), who find that, 
under these conditions, the Taylor Principle can be insufficient for equilibrium 
determinacy6.
On a wider perspective, financial structure may influence interest rate 
pass-through by affecting the response of the financial markets to macroeconomic 
conditions. In particular, a macroeconomic shock may impact market interest rates 
directly and in addition to the response of the policy rate to the shock. In this sense, 
not only market rates may react with a delay to movements in policy rates, but also 
they may react more, less, or simply not react at all in the short run. As a result, 
2 The importance of the banking sector in the interest rate pass-through is theoretically studied by 
Hannan and Berger (1991) and empirically assessed by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994). For an overview 
of the banking industry and monetary policy literature see Ahumada and Fuentes (2004).
3 In contrast to the classical monetarist view that emphasizes the role of narrow and broad monetary 
aggregates in determining prices. 
4 Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) consider the financial structure as a term that broadly includes differ-
ent features such as the degree of development of financial markets, the degree of competition within 
the banking system, the existence of constraints on capital movements and the ownership structure 
of the financial intermediaries. 
5 According to Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) interest rate stickiness means that in the presence of 
a change of money market rates, bank rates change by a smaller amount in the short run (short-run 
stickiness) and possibly also in the long run (long-run stickiness). 
6 This principle states that nominal interest rates have to respond at least one-for-one to changes in 
the expected inflation rate to guarantee a stable and unique equilibrium.32 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
the estimation of interest rate pass-through must control for the direct impact of 
other macro variables on market rates. This is the theme of our paper.
2.2  Interest Rate Pass-Through in Colombia
Studies for Colombia have found that, although there is a long-term 
relationship between policy and bank interest rates, interest rate pass-through 
is incomplete. Julio (2001) finds a stable long-term relationship between the 
interest rates in Colombia using cointegration for two periods, before and after 
the removal of the exchange rate band. Huertas et al. (2005) use descriptive sta-
tistics7 to estimate that a 1% change in the monetary policy rate implies a change 
of 0.26% in the 90-day CDs interest rate in the short-run and a change of 0.6% in 
the long run8. Melo et al. (2006) using a multivariate VARX-GARCH model find 
a response of 38 basic points (b.p.) for the interbank interest rate and of 7 b.p. for 
the 90-day CDs rate to a change of 100 b.p. in the policy rate, during the period 
January 2001-September 2005.
Additionally, some of these studies have also documented the importance 
of the banking sector in Colombia and have suggested its significance in the 
transmission of interest rates. Huertas et al. (2005) show that bank credit was the 
most important source of funds for firms between 2000 and 20049. However, they 
indicate that the rather low transmission of the monetary policy interest rate to 
market interest rates can be explained by a loss in the effectiveness of the credit 
channel. They attribute this to the increase of banks’ holdings of Government 
bonds as an alternative to loans10, and to the declining share of bank loans as a 
source of funds for firms during this period11.
Given the documented importance of the banking sector in the transmission 
mechanism in Colombia, a complete analysis of interest rate pass-through must 
involve bank behavior and the equilibrium in the loan and deposit markets, and its 
estimation must control for movements in other macroeconomic variables apart 
from the policy interest rate. Here we take into account these arguments to estimate 
the short run and long run interest rate pass-through for the Colombian case.
7 The authors also use VAR models in differences in order to see the impact of the interbank interest 
rate on the 90-day CDs interest rate (DTF).
8 The short run corresponds to one week and the long-run elasticity was calculated as an average 
of the change in the interest rates between movements in policy rates during the period from March 
2001 to December 2004. 
9 The authors analyze a sample of 3.585 financial-statement-reporting firms. 
10 According to the authors the proportion of the private credit on the banks’ total assets was 85% in 
1994 and 65% in 2004, while the banks’ public investments as a proportion of the total assets increased 
from 7% to 27% during the same period. 
11 This is in agreement with the results of Zamudio and Martinez (2006), who find that firms decreased 
their debt with the financial sector in 2005 and internal savings were their main source of funds (52% 
in contrast to 48% of external resources). Interest Rate Pass-Through in Colombia 33
3.  A Micro-Banking Model
Recently, microeconomic models of banks’ behavior have been used to 
explain the role of financial structure in the transmission of interest rates. Berstein 
and Fuentes (2003) present a Monti-Klein model to explain the long run behavior 
of the banks under imperfect competition, taking into account the existence of 
credit risk. By using disaggregated data for different banks, they find that banks’ 
characteristics can influence the degree of delay in the market interest rate response 
to changes in the policy rate. Kot (2004) uses a similar microeconomic approach 
to assess the impact of the degree of competition in the credit market on the inter-
est rates pass-through. Amaya (2005) find empirical evidence for Colombia of 
the importance of banks’ characteristics and inflation as long-run drivers of the 
market interest rates in a competitive setting.
Following this strand of the literature, a partial equilibrium model is used 
in order to explain the transmission of interest rates under a perfectly competitive 
structure of the banking sector. From this model, two main results are obtained. 
First, some macroeconomic variables apart from the policy rate are important 
determinants of equilibrium market interest rates. Second, the relationship be-
tween policy and market interest rates may not be “one-for-one” and possibly 
not even linear.
3.1  Assumptions
Following Freixas and Rochet (1997) we consider a micro-banking model 
which allows for the existence of liquidity risk. This risk appears when there is 
an insufficient amount of reserves to serve the total amount of withdrawals made 
by the depositors.
We assume that the level of reserves (R) chosen by banks and the amount 
of withdrawals (X) made by agents depend on the level of deposits, so R = rD 
and  Xx D =   where  0 1 ≤≤ r  and   x ∈    01 , . This implies that the maximum 
amount of withdrawals is equal to the total amount of deposits12 and that when 
 xr ∈(   ,1 , banks have to borrow the shortfall from the Central Bank, incurring a 
cost  ID rr D x r p , m ax , ( ) = − ( )     Ε 0  , where rp is the policy interest rate. Further, 
we assume that the proportion of withdrawals follows a uniform distribution
between 0 and 1, so that   xU ~ , 01 ( ) and ID r
rD
r




Additionally, to understand how credit risk affects the competitive pricing 
of loans, we introduce a simple approach in which banks can recover only a frac-
tion δ of the loans granted (L). The recovered proportion depends positively on 
the economic conditions of agents, measured by the income (Y)13, and negatively 
12 In contrast to Freixas and Rochet (1997), there are no additional deposits.
13 If firms and households have good economic conditions, they can repay their loans with higher 
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on the loan interest rate (rL)14. Therefore, only a proportion δ (Y, rL) of the loans 
are paid back and only on this portion, agents pay interest. Thus, each bank has a 
net revenue given by rY rL Yr L LL L δδ ,, . ( ) −− ( ) ( ) 1
Since banking activity is modeled as the production of deposit and loan 
services, the technology is represented by a cost function C (D, L) that can be 
interpreted as the cost of managing a volume D of deposits and a volume L of 
loans. The cost function is the same for all banks15. Moreover, it can be assumed 
without loss of generality that costs are separable (cross-effects are zero), which 
means that we don’t take into account the existence of economies of scope in the 
joint production of loans and deposits.
Finally, we incorporate banks’ holdings of government domestic bonds 
as an important decision variable, given that they have increased rapidly in 
Colombia since 2000. Thus, banks can invest in this riskless but illiquid asset 
(T), with return rT.
3.2  The Bank’s Problem
Assuming a given banking technology, we examine the behavior of this 
sector under a perfectly competitive structure, where there are N risk-neutral banks 
that are price takers16. Each bank chooses the volumes of deposits (D), loans (L), 
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14 This can be interpreted in two ways. First, an increase in the loan interest rate implies a higher cost 
of resources for agents, causing a higher probability of default. The second interpretation follows 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) credit rationing argument, according to which an increase in the loan inter-
est rate changes the risk of the population, either because agents take more risky projects or because 
less risky firms drop out of the market. 
15 This function is supposed to satisfy the usual conditions of convexity and regularity. 
16 They take as given the rate of loans, rL , the rate of deposits, rD , the return on government securi-
ties, rT , and the policy rate, rp . Interest Rate Pass-Through in Colombia 35
This problem can be rewritten as follows:
(2)
 

























where bank’s profits are the revenues on assets (loans and government securi-
ties17) minus the interest paid on the liabilities (deposits), the costs from credit 
and liquidity risks, and the operational costs.
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where  ′ CL  and  ′ CD  are the operational marginal costs of loans and deposits, 
respectively. As in Freixas and Rochet (1997) and to simplify our analysis, these 
costs are assumed to be constant, so  ′ = CL L γ  and  ′ = CD D γ .
17 We assume that reserves do not have any return because we do not take into account the interbank 
market. It means that banks keep in cash their reserves and that they borrow only from the Central 
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Equation (3) implies that a competitive bank chooses the optimal amount of
deposits in such a way that the marginal net revenue (taking into account the credit
risk)18,  1 1 1 − ( ) ( ) + ( )−    − r r r L D δ . , must equal the marginal cost, which corresponds
to the illiquidity and the operational costs19,  1
2













L D γ γ .
Equation (4) states that the marginal revenue on government bonds, rT 
, 
must equal their marginal opportunity cost (of not lending to private agents, taking 
into account the credit risk),  δ γ . ( ) + ( )−− 1 1 rL L . Finally, from equation (5), the 
optimal level of reserves depends on their opportunity cost (of not lending these 
resources to private agents), relative to the savings from not having to borrow





3.3  Equilibrium in the Deposit and Credit Markets
In order to close the model and find the equilibrium market rates, we put 
together the balance sheets of the banks and the equilibrium conditions for the 
Deposit and Credit markets. The competitive equilibrium is characterized then by 
equations (3)-(5) and the following conditions:
(7)  DD rrr Y
s
DD T = ( ) ,,,
*
(8)  LL rrY
d
LL = ( ) ,,
*




DD T =−( ) − ,,,
*







* ( ) is the total supply of deposits by non-financial agents, which 
depends positively on the domestic deposit interest rate and income, and 
negatively on the foreign deposit interest rate and the return on govern-
ment securities. It is assumed that these two types of assets are imperfect 




* ( ) is the loan demand by non-financial agents in the economy, 
that depends negatively on the loan domestic interest rate and positively 
on the agents’ level of income. It also depends positively on foreign loans 
18 This net income becomes from the possibility of lend a proportion (1 – r) of the deposits and pay 
interest on the total amount of deposits. It is necessary to take into account that there is a credit risk 
that not allows recovering all the loans granted and only a proportion of them pay interest.
19 The illiquidity and the loan management costs depend on the proportion of deposits granted in 
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interest rates, which are assumed to be imperfect substitutes of domestic 
loans.
•	 T s  is  the  exogenous  supply  of  securities  by  the  government  and
  T rrr Y b
d
DD T − ( ) ,,,
*  is the demand of these securities by other agents in the 
  economy different from banks. It depends positively on the income and 
the own return, and negatively on the interest rate paid by domestic and 
foreign deposits, considered as imperfect substitutes of these securities.
Hence, in equilibrium:









* * ( ) =− ( ) ( )−+ − 1 , ,,,
* rr Y DT ( )
The equilibrium deposit and loan interest rates are derived from equa-
tions (3), (4), (5) and (11), as implicit functions of the exogenous variables 
rr rrrTY L L pLD
S
L D = ( ) ,,,, ,,
** γγ and rr rrrTY D D pLD
S
L D = ( ) ,,,, ,,
** γγ. These functions are 
potentially non-linear because they depend on the functional forms of the deposit 
supply and loan demand20.
3.4  The Results
The comparative statics analysis of equations (3)-(5) and (11) allows us 
to appreciate the effects of shocks to the exogenous variables on deposit and loan 
interest rates (see Appendix A for the details).
Result 1: The effect of a shift in the monetary policy interest rate, rp, on the equi-
librium loan interest rate is positive. The effect of the same shift on the deposit 
interest rate is ambiguous.
An increase in the policy interest rate makes the liquidity shortage more 
costly for banks. This has two implications. On the one hand, banks have more 
incentives to keep a higher level of reserves, implying a decrease in banks’ loan 
supply or an increase in deposit demand. Hence, there is an upward pressure on loan 
and deposit interest rates. On the other hand, since the cost of illiquidity depends 
on the amount of deposits, the rise in policy rates makes deposits more expensive 
and reduces banks’ demand for them. This pushes deposit rates down.
Result 2: A change in the foreign interest rates or the expectations of depreciation 
has a positive effect on equilibrium loan and deposit interest rates.
If the foreign interest rates or the expectations of depreciation rise, agents 
in the domestic economy perceive a higher cost of borrowing abroad, increasing 
their demand for domestic loans. Thus, domestic loan interest rates increase. The 
higher demand for loans makes banks raise their deposit demand at the same time 
that agents reduce their supply of deposits because foreign deposits are more at-
tractive. Hence, deposit interest rates also increase.
20 Also, these functions can be non-linear if the withdrawals have a non-uniform probability 
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Result 3: The effect of a change in the income level on the equilibrium loan and 
deposit interest rates is ambiguous.
An increase in income raises deposit supply and loan demand, implying a 
decline in the deposit rate and an increase in the loan rate. In order to satisfy the 
higher demand for loans, banks increase their demand for deposits, pushing deposit 
interest rates up. Additionally, given that credit risk is reduced by the agents’ better 
conditions (a higher proportion of loans will be recovered), banks have incentives 
to increase their loan supply inducing a downward pressure on loan rates. As a 
result, the effect of the shift in income on market rates is ambiguous.
Result 4: An increase in the government securities supply, T s, implies a rise in 
the equilibrium level of loan and deposit interest rates.
An additional supply of government securities competes with loans in banks’ 
portfolios and with deposits in the agents’ portfolios. This implies a reduction in the 
supply of deposits by firms and households, and a drop in the loan supply by com-
mercial banks, increasing interest rates. This effect is reinforced if banks increase 
their demand for deposits to fund their purchases of government securities.
Notice that, in general, the response of market interest rates to the exog-
enous shocks may not be linear and could depend on macro variables affecting the 
elasticities of the loan supply and the demand for deposits. In other words, that 
response is complex and may depend on the state of the economy. Furthermore, 
it is possible that a shock to an exogenous variable has an impact on others. For 
example, an increase in the foreign interest rate may cause movements in the 
policy rate, the expectations of depreciation and output. Hence, the observed 
response of market rates to “a” shock may involve a reaction to movements in 
several variables.
As a corollary, we conclude that there is a possibly complex relationship 
between policy and market interest rates. We also conclude that interest rate pass-
through depends on the state of the economy and that its estimation must control 
for the presence of other shocks hitting the financial markets.
4.  Empirical Evidence for Colombia
The literature for Colombia has shown that the importance of substitutes for 
loans in banks’ and firms’ balance sheets has increased since 2000 (Huertas et al., 
2005 and Zamudio and Martinez, 2006). This change may reflect the adjustment 
made by agents after the financial crisis and the recession of 1998-1999, and not 
necessarily a structural change. A reduction of the loan supply might have been 
due to the higher risk perception of the economy by the financial system after the 
crisis, and a decrease in loan demand could have occurred because of an explicit 
policy of leverage reduction by firms and households.
However, bank loans and deposits remain an important component of private 
sector liabilities and assets. According to the flow of funds accounts, financial 
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during the period 1996-200421. This proportion fell after the recession, but has 
recovered in recent years (Figure 1). Further, the proportion of small firms’ and 
households’ total assets held as deposits in the financial system was on average 
42%, for the same period. This evidence suggests that the banking sector plays a 
relevant role as a provider of funds and as a deposit system for the private sector 
in the Colombian economy22.
For this reason, financial system (loan and deposit) interest rates are impor-
tant components of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in Colombia. 
In this context, the model developed above suggests that the study of the effects 
of macroeconomic variables on deposit and loan markets is especially relevant. 
In particular, changes in country risk perceptions, banks’ holdings of Government 
securities or in the loan portfolio quality could explain the dynamics of market 
and policy rates23 and their divergence during the periods January 2000-February 
2001 and July 2002-May 2003 in Colombia (Figures 2 and 3).
21 This figure is 18% for financial-statement-reporting firms in the same period.
22 According to Villar et al. (2005), in 2001 the domestic private credit/GDP ratio (a measure of fi-
nancial deepening) was 25% for Colombia, similar to the ratios for Argentina, Perú and Ecuador. This 
indicator was 65% for Chile, 97% for Thailand, 125% for China and 150% for Malaysia.
23 The policy rate corresponds to the interest rate at which the Central Bank gives liquidity to the 
market by means of an auction, which is called Subasta de Expansión. The market interest rates are 
the lending and deposit rates. The first one is the average interest rate for all types of loans weighted 
by their volume. The second one can be measured by the DTF, which corresponds to the weighted 
average of the interest rates for the 90-day CDs, and by the M3 interest rate, which corresponds to the 
weighted average of the interest rates for different types of deposits. 
FIGURE 1
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FIGURE 2
















































































































































































































































































a) Interest rates in percentage




90-day deposit interest rate (DTF)
Loan minus policy rate DTF minus policy rate M3 minus policy rate
Source: Banco de la República.
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FIGURE 3






















































































































































































































































































































Nominal Foreign Interest Rate in US dollars Loan Quality
Colombia EMBI and Nominal Depreciation Government Securities/Total Financial Sector Assets
Source: Banco de la República. Source: Datastream.











4.1  Econometric Evidence
The theoretical model developed previously implies that market interest 
rates are affected by factors other than the policy rate. Therefore, the estimation 
of interest rate pass-through must control for movements in other macroeconomic 
variables, which may impact the loan and deposit markets equilibrium.
Using the Colombian data for the period June 1999-August 2006 we test 
this hypothesis following two approaches. First, we assume the existence of a 
long run relationship between market and policy interest rates. Then we estimate 
uni-equational error correction models for the market rates, in which other macro 
variables suggested by the theoretical model are included as explanatory variables 
of the short run dynamics.
In the second approach we acknowledge that some of the macro explanatory 
variables may be endogenous in a general equilibrium context. Hence, we estimate 
a VARX, perform Granger causality tests for the market interest rate equation to 
verify the significance of the macro variables in determining its dynamics, and 
examine the impulse response functions to check the direction of the market inter-
est rate reaction to different shocks.42 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
Uni-equational Error Correction Models
Assuming a long run relationship between market and policy interest rates, 
we estimate uni-equational error correction models for two different measures of 
the deposit interest rate, a weighted average of the 90-day CDs interest rates (DTF) 
and a weighted average of the interest rates for different types of deposits (M3). The 
short run dynamics is modeled using the EMBI, the foreign interest rate (LIBOR), 
the industrial production index (as a measure of output) and the nominal depreciation 
as explanatory variables (For the description of the variables see Appendix C).
Tables 1 and 2, show the estimations of two different models for each 
measure of the deposit interest rate. The first model takes as explanatory variables 
the EMBI, the LIBOR and the policy interest rate, which can be assumed to be 
exogenous in a more general model. The second model also includes the nominal 
depreciation and the industrial production index (IPI) as exogenous variables, al-
though they can be endogenous in a more general setting. In most cases, variables 
different from the policy interest rate and the residual of the long run equation24 
are significant in the error correction equations and the signs are those predicted 
by the theory, with the notable exception of the foreign interest rate.
The results show that the most important variable in the determination of 
the deposit interest rate, in terms of the short run effect, is the policy rate. The sum 
of the policy rate coefficients in the EC equation is 0.92 for the DTF and 0.90 for 
the M3 interest rate in the first model. However, when the industrial production is 
introduced in the second model, this variable has the biggest effect on the DTF and 
the effect of the policy rate is reduced to 0.64. Although, the IPI is not significant 
for the M3 interest rate the effect of the policy rate decreases to 0.82 in the second 
model because of the existence of other explanatory variables.
The significance of the estimated coefficients for the macro variables, 
other than the policy rate, indicates their importance in the determination of the 
deposit rates. For example, in the first model an increase of 100 basis points 
(b.p.) in the EMBI produces an increase of 53 b.p. in the DTF and of 30 b.p. in 
the M3 interest rate, as expected in the theoretical model25. Also, an increase 
of 1% in the IPI implies a decrease of 1.5% in the DTF, meaning that the rise in 
the deposit supply due to a higher agents’ income compensates the additional 
banks’ demand for deposits to satisfy a higher demand for loans. On the other 
hand, although the coefficient of the foreign interest rate is significant, its sign 
is not as expected, indicating that there is an effect not explained by the theo-
retical model.
24 This residual is obtained from the estimation of the long run relationship between the policy and 
the deposit interest rate. 
25 However, when the depreciation and the industrial production index are introduced in the second 
model the effect of the EMBI is reduced to 9 b.p. on the DTF and to 14 b.p. on the M3 rate. Interest Rate Pass-Through in Colombia 43
TABLE 1
UNI-EQUATIONAL ERROR CORRECTION MODELS FOR CHANGES IN
THE 90-DAY DEPOSIT INTEREST RATE































Adjusted R-squared 0.831 0.721
S.E. of regression 0.215 0.291
Sum squared resid 3.147 6.248
Log likelihood 15.949 –10.805
Durbin-Watson stat 2.268 1.820
Akaike info criterion –0.099 0.459
Schwarz criterion 0.259 0.693
F-statistic 36.245 30.890
Standard error in parenthesis.
*  This model does not consider variables which can be endogenous.
  Sample 2000:01 - 2006:08. Included observations: 80 after adjustments.
**  This model includes other variables that can be endogenous in a more general model.
  Sample 1999:11 - 2006: 08. Included observations: 82 after adjustments44 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
TABLE 2
UNI-EQUATIONAL ERROR CORRECTION MODELS
FOR CHANGES IN THE M3 INTEREST RATE




















Adjusted R-squared 0.667 0.730
S.E. of regression 0.253 0.228
Sum squared resid 4.858 3.831
Log likelihood –0.484 9.250
Durbin-Watson stat 1.506 1.525
Akaike info criterion 0.158 –0.030
Schwarz criterion 0.334 0.204
F-statistic 33.457 32.339
Standard error in parenthesis
*  This model does not consider variables which can be endogenous.
  Sample 1999:11 - 2006:08. Included observations: 82 after adjustments.
**  This model includes other variables that can be endogenous in a more general model.
  Sample 1999:11 - 2006: 08. Included observations: 82 after adjustments.
The cumulative impulse-response functions (Figures 4 and 5) show that the 
long run pass-through from the policy rate to the DTF is complete in both models. 
However, this pass-through is incomplete for the M3 interest rate (the long run 
response of the M3 rate to a change in the policy rate is less than one).
The previous results imply that the short run interest rate pass-through 
to the deposit rate is incomplete but that the long run pass-through is complete 
at least for the DTF. Moreover, these results show that the introduction of some 
macroeconomic variables reduces the impact of the policy rate on the deposit 
rate, given their significance in the explanation of the market interest rates 
behavior.Interest Rate Pass-Through in Colombia 45
FIGURE 4
ERROR CORRECTION IMPULSE-RESPONSE FUNCTIONS
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FIGURE 5
ERROR CORRECTION IMPULSE-RESPONSE FUNCTIONS
FOR THE M3 INTEREST RATE
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VARX models
To assess the impact of exogenous shocks on deposit interest rates, one must 
take into account not only their direct effect, but also the indirect effects that occur 
through other macro variables that are endogenous in a general equilibrium context, 
such as the exchange rate and the output. There may be also feed-back from market 
rates themselves to those macro endogenous variables. To capture the richer dynamics 
implied by the argument above, we estimate VARX models for a set of variables in 
first differences. We assume that the EMBI, the foreign interest rates (the LIBOR) 
and the policy rates are exogenous variables, while deposit rates, inflation, nominal 
depreciation and our measure of output are treated as endogenous.
In order to verify our hypothesis, we check the significance of variables 
other than the policy rate in the deposit rate equation by means of Granger cau-
sality tests. Tables 3 and 4 show these tests for two specifications of VARX that 
include the DTF or the M3 interest rate, respectively26. According to the equation 
26 There may exist a bias in the estimation because we are not taking into account the long run rela-
tionship between market and policy interest rates and other long run relations between the variables 
included in the VARX. A method that allows to estimate the correct long and short run relationships 
is a VEC, but the sample is too short to use this technique.
TABLE 3
GRANGER CAUSALITY TESTS ON DEPOSITS INTEREST RATE (DTF)
Null Hypothesis Test-value Probability 
ΔDEPRECIATION not Granger cause DDTF 31.01 0.0001
ΔIPI not Granger cause DDTF 4.70 0.5825
ΔINFLATION not Granger cause DDTF 7.30 0.2938
ΔEMBI not Granger cause DDTF 32.42 0.0001
ΔPOLICY not Granger cause DDTF 98.35 0.0001
ΔLIBOR not Granger cause DDTF 12.77 0.0778
Note:  The estimated VARX model uses 6 lags for the endogenous and exogenous variables.
TABLE 4
GRANGER CAUSALITY TESTS ON M3 INTEREST RATE
Null Hypothesis Test-value Probability 
ΔDEPRECIATION not Granger cause DM3 25.07 0.0003
ΔIPI not Granger cause DM3 8.43 0.2086
ΔINFLATION not Granger cause DM3 16.70 0.0104
ΔEMBI not Granger cause DM3 26.28 0.0004
ΔPOLICY not Granger cause DM3 99.74 0.0001
ΔLIBOR not Granger cause DM3 15.50 0.0301
Note:  The estimated VARX model uses 6 lags for the endogenous and exogenous variables.48 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
FIGURE 6
CUMULATIVE IMPULSE-RESPONSE FUNCTIONS
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FIGURE 7
CUMULATIVE IMPULSE-RESPONSE FUNCTIONS
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for the DTF, the policy rate, the nominal depreciation, the EMBI and the LIBOR 
Granger-cause this deposit rate. Also, the policy rate, the inflation, the nominal 
depreciation, the EMBI and the LIBOR Granger-cause the M3 deposit rate.
From the cumulative impulse-response functions of the VARX models, we 
examine the impact of some shocks on the two measures of deposit rates (Figures 6 
and 7). These functions show a large (higher than one) long run reaction of the 
market interest rates to policy rate shocks. In this context, this response may be 
regarded as an appropriate measure of the long-run interest rate pass-through, 
since most direct and indirect effects are taken into account.
For other shocks, the market interest rates long-run response is in agree-
ment with the theoretical model with the exception of the LIBOR, whose effect 
is counter-intuitive. In particular, the EMBI has the second highest effect on the 
deposit rates, after the effect of the policy rate, and the IPI has an ambiguous effect 
depending on the measure of the deposit rate.
5.  Conclusions
In contrast to the standard approach to monetary policy, which considers 
the banking sector as a passive aggregate, this paper shows the implications of 
modeling commercial banks as independent entities that optimally react to their 
environment. Based on a theoretical microeconomic model of the banking firm and 
the credit and deposits markets, we illustrate the idea that the response of market 
interest rates to changes in the policy interest rate may be a complex process that 
depends on the macroeconomic variables comprising the state of the economy.
Given these theoretical results, we argue that the estimation of interest rate 
pass-through must control for the variables affecting the financial system and the 
behavior of banks. The results from uni-equational error correction and VARX 
models for the Colombian data seem to support our hypotheses. These estimations 
imply that the short run interest rate pass-through to the deposit rate is incomplete 
while in the long run the transmission of a change in the policy rate is complete. 
Furthermore, these results show the significance of other macroeconomic variables 
different from the policy rate on the dynamics of different measures of the deposit 
interest rate, as suggested by the theoretical model developed above.
Finally, a policy implication follows immediately from the previous argu-
ments and results. The Central Bank’s policy decision should take into account 
the direct effects of macro variables on market rates and consider the complex 
relationship between policy and market rates. If these factors are empirically rel-
evant, a failure by the Central Bank to include them in its reaction function may 
increase the risk of missing its targets and/or may introduce excessive volatility 
to interest rates and output. The importance for the Central Bank of the role of 
banks and financial markets in the interest rate pass-through can be understood 
by means of a small-open economy macro model that includes a version of our 
micro-banking model. This is the matter of future research.Interest Rate Pass-Through in Colombia 51
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Appendix A
THE MICRO-BANKING MODEL
A.1.  Effect of a marginal shift in the monetary policy interest rate:














































































































































2  is the direct impact of the policy rate on 
  the deposit rate. This effect is negative because a higher policy rate implies 
a higher illiquidity cost and, as the withdrawals depend on the amount of 
deposits, banks will demand deposits only at lower deposit rates.
(ii)  ∂
∂













. 1  is the impact of the loan interest rate on the govern-
  ment securities return, which is ambiguous because a positive shift in loan







  the economic conditions are good, the proportion of recovered loans δ . ( ) 







 will be positive. Intuitively,  δ
δ







 is the bank’s marginal 
  revenue derived from an increase in rL. If it is positive, banks will increase 
loans, demand less government bonds and the price of the latter will fall 
























 is the impact of the loan interest rate on the 
  banks’ fraction of reserves It is also ambiguous and depends on credit risk. 
As before, if the increase in credit risk is smaller than the recovered pro-
portion of loans, this effect is negative. Intuitively, if the bank’s revenues 






















 is the impact of loan interest 
  rate on deposit rates. From equation (4), we know that  δ γ . ( ) + ( )− − ( ) 1 1 rL L  
  is positive if there are positive returns on government securities. Additionally, 
  as before, if  δ
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0. Intuitively, if the bank’s 
  revenues increase with the rise in rL, they will demand more deposits 
inducing an upward pressure on rD.
(v)  ∂
∂






δ γ .1 1
2  is the direct impact of the policy rate on the 
  proportion of reserves, which is positive if rT > 0. If the policy rate increases, 
the illiquidity cost goes up, and banks prefer to keep a higher proportion 





 is positive if  δ
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 and the own elas-
ticity on the demand for deposits (demand for government securities) is greater 
than the cross-elasticity with respect to the return on government securities (the 




























. Thus we suppose that 
agents react more to the own returns of each asset than to the return of alternative 
assets.
The impact of a change in the policy rate on the deposit interest rate depends 
on the direct effect, which is negative, and the effect through the loan rate, which 
is positive. Then, the final effect is ambiguous.
A.2.  Effect of a marginal change in the foreign interest rates
Differentiating equation (10) with respect to  rL
*  and  rD



















































































































































































































 are explained and signed above. The signs of these
two expressions depend again on the assumptions about the elasticities. If we 
assume that the direct elasticities are higher than the cross-elasticities, then the 
impact of a change in the foreign interest rates is positive on the loan and deposit 
interest rates.
A.3.  Effect of a marginal shift in the level of income:
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p
δ γ δ .1 11  is positive, because an increase in the 
  level of income improves the credit risk perception of banks and induce 



















0. An increase in the level of income 
  improves the credit risk perception of banks, induce them to grant more 
loans and to reduce their demand for government securities. Thus, the 












1 δ  is negative. If the output increases, credit risk is lower 
  and banks prefer to grant more loans and keep less reserves.56 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008












0 , at the 
same time that banks grant more loans. The final impact on the deposit rate is also 







while banks increase their demand for deposits.
A.4.  Effect of a marginal shift in the government securities supply
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Appendix B
In this appendix we show some econometric results. First we show the results 
of unit root tests for the interest rates. Then the estimated long-run relationship 
between policy and market interest rates is shown.
B.1.  Unit Root Tests
We carry out two unit root tests, the Augmented Dickey Fuller and the 
KPSS, in order to check the non-stationarity of the interest rates (Table 5). The 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test does not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for 
the DTF at all significance levels. For the M3 this hypothesis is not rejected at 1% 
of significance. The test for the policy rate shows that the unit root hypothesis is 
not rejected at 1% and 5%27. For the three interest rates, the KPSS test rejects the 
null hypothesis that each variable is stationary at all levels of significance. We can 
conclude from these results that the analyzed interest rates are I(1).
27 For this test we take the minimum number of lags to get white-noise in the residuals. If the informa-




Ho: variable has a unit root
KPSS Test









1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10%
DTF (1) –1.047 –3.517 –2.899 –2.587 1.050 0.739 0.463 0.347
M3 interest rate –3.407 –3.510 –2.896 –2.585 1.096 0.739 0.463 0.347
Policy interest rate (3) –2.774 –3.511 –2.896 –2.586 0.928 0.739 0.463 0.347
(1)  9 Lags used to get white noise residuals.
(2)  2 Lags used to get white noise residuals.
(3)  3 Lags used to get white noise residuals.
B.2.  Long Run Relationship
The estimated long-run relationship between the policy rate and the deposit 
interest rates is shown in Table 6. The unit root tests show that the residual of the 
equation for the DTF is stationary at 5% and 10%, with the Engle-Yoo critical 
values. The residuals of the equation for the M3 interest rate do not present a unit 
root according to the Engle-Yoo (1987) critical values at all significance levels. 
These results imply that there is a cointegration between the deposit interest rates 




DTF (1) M3 (2)
Constant 1.132 –0.777980
(0.345) (0.271)
Policy Rate 1.003 0.822
(0.037) (0.029)
Test Statistic* –2.575 –3.075
Engle Yoo Critical Values**
1% 5% 10%
2.60 1.95 1.61
*  Ho: existence of a unit root.
**  Critical values for a sample of 100 observations and non-constant.
(1)  3 Lags used in the residual test to get white noise.
(2)  Lags = 3 used in the residual test to get white noise.58 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
Appendix C
The description of the variables used in the econometric exercise is given 
in the following table.
TABLE 7 
DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES
Variable Definition Sample Frequency Source
ΔDTF Difference of the 
nominal 90-day deposit 
interest rate
June 1999 August 2006 Monthly Banco de la República
ΔM3 (1) Difference of the 
nominal average 
deposit interest rate 
June 1999 August 2006 Monthly Banco de la República
ΔPOLICY Difference of the 
nominal policy interest 
rate “Subasta de 
Expansión”
June 1999 August 2006 Monthly Banco de la República





June 1999 August 2006 Monthly Banco de la República
ΔINFLATION Difference of the 
consumer annual 
inflation
June 1999 August 2006 Monthly DANE
ΔIPI Logarithmic difference 
of the deseasonal 
industrial production 
index 
June 1999 August 2006 Monthly DANE
Authors
ΔEMBI Difference of the EMBI 
Colombia
June 1999 August 2006 Monthly Bloomberg
ΔLIBOR (2) Difference of the 
nominal LIBOR in 
dollars.
June 1999 August 2006 Monthly Datastream
(1)  The M3 interest rate corresponds to the average of the interest rates for different types of deposits 
(saving accounts, 90-day CDs and 360-day CDs) weighted by their volume.
(2)  LIBOR (London Interbank Offer Rate) is the interest rate for 3-month deposits in dollars.